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II. DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
The nature of the case is more accurately stated as follows:
This is an action for quiet title by the grantors of a deed of trust securing a loan from

Defendant/Respondent, Bank of Eastern Oregon ("BEO"). The debt secured by the deed of trust
remains unpaid, but the foreclosure remedies for the deed of trust have expired.
In addition, the Plaintiffs/Appellants, Brett W. and Mary E. Bennett ("Bennetts") seek
quiet title against a personal judgment for the debt partially secured by the deed of trust and
which has expired by operation of law and is no longer a cloud on Bennetts' title.

B.

Course of proceedings in Trial Court
BEO agrees with the Bennetts' statement of the course of proceedings in District Court.

C.

Statement of Facts
BEO accepts Bennetts' statement of facts with the following additions.
The Bennetts admit that their bankruptcy discharge did not void BEO' s lien from the

deed of trust (R.p. 66, L.5-6). It appears from the bankruptcy record that Bennetts' real property
was released to Bennetts for administration pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 554(c).

III. DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Is the grantor of a deed of trust, the remedies for which have expired, entitled to quiet
title without alleging or tendering payment for the secured debt?
2. Is Trusty v. Ray, 73 Idaho 232 (1952), still good law?
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3. Is it error to deny quiet title against a judgment which is expired and unenforceable
by operation of law and no longer creates a cloud on title?
4. Is the filing of a foreign judgment pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgment Act (EFJA), as opposed to the proceeding which produced the foreign
judgment, an "act or proceeding" under Idaho's one action rule, Idaho Code § 451503(1)?

IV.

A.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

BEO is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal under Idaho Code§ 12-121.
Due to the frivolous nature of the present litigation, Bennetts should be responsible for

reasonable attorney fees incurred by BEO in defending this appeal.
In any civil action, the court may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party
or parties when the judge finds that the case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation. Idaho Code § 12-121. This statutory power is discretionary;
the Court will award attorney fees when the Court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal
was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Minich v.

Gem State Developers, 99 Idaho 911,918 (1979) (emphasis added).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that maintaining an action in instances where previous
case law definitively contradicts a claimant's position can be a basis for finding that litigation is
frivolous and that the opposing party is entitled to attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 12-121.

Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898, 902 (1997) (holding that, since plaintiffs had ignored the
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guidance of established case law in manufacturing elements of a claim, the action was frivolous
and that the defendant was entitled to attorney fees under§ 12-121).
Similar to Cameron, Bennetts are maintaining the current action in direct contradiction of
established case law. Prior to initiating this action, Bennetts had guidance from Trusty v. Ray, a
definitive ruling on the issues they raise, based on a set of directly analogous facts, upheld by
dozens of subsequent decisions, telling them that their quiet title action was without merit. In
Trusty v. Ray, the Idaho Supreme Court held unequivocally that a mortgagor and any subsequent

purchaser in privity with that mortgagor cannot quiet title to real property without paying their
debt even when enforcement of the mortgage is barred by the statute of limitations. Trusty v.
Ray, 73 Idaho 232, 236-3 7 (1952). Even with the benefit of guidance from Trusty, Bennetts

seeks to quiet title on real property without satisfying their mortgage debt.
Such inequitable conduct in direct contradiction of established case law constitutes
frivolous litigation under§ 12-121. BEO therefore asks this Court to award reasonable attorney's
fees on appeal incurred in defending the Bennetts' frivolous claims.
V.
A.

ARGUMENT

Bennetts' action for quiet title against the expired judgment lien is moot because the
judgment fails to create a cloud on title by operation of law, and because it involves
a debt for which a remaining deed of trust exists.

In ruling on the motion to dismiss relating to the expired judgment, the Trial Court did
not rule (as suggested by Bennetts' App. Br., p.10) that the Bennetts "may not maintain an
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action ... " Rather, the Court correctly noted that it is a "nonissue" (Tr. p. 24, L. 14-16). It is a
nonissue for three reasons.
1. Bennetts' action to quiet title for the expired judgment lien is moot because there
is, by operation of law, no cloud on title.
Chapter 10 of the Idaho Code makes clear that liens resulting from the recordation of a
judgment expire by operation of law and cease to encumber property following expiration. As
written in 2011, at the time of recordation of the abstract of judgment, liens resulting from such
recordation "continue[d] five (5) years from the date of the judgment", unless the judgment was
satisfied before such time. Idaho Code § 10-1110 (2011 version). Idaho Code § 10-1111 also
reiterates the impact of the five (5) year lien when discussing the ability to renew such liens,
where it reads: "Unless the judgment has been satisfied, at any time prior to the expiration of

the lien created by section 10-1110, Idaho Code." (emphasis added). This language means that
impact of a failure to renew is not simply a loss of the lien's priority position with respect the
property, the lien is lost and renewal of the judgment and refiling is required to gain a new lien
interest in the property. "Idaho Code section 10-1111 ( 1) does not allow for sua sponte renewal"

Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho 58, 69 (2013). Idaho law simply does not allow a lien to continue to
encumber the property past the applicable time allowed by statute.
2. Bennetts conceded that the expired judgment lien no longer creates a cloud on
title.
In the course of argument in the Trial Court, the judge questioned whether the judgment
is a nonissue, asking Bennetts' counsel, "It does not show up on a title report; right?" {Tr. p.24,
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L.14-16) Bennetts' counsel responded: "Well, your honor, it did previously show up on a title
report. And I think the title company may have taken it off based upon some argument." {Tr.
p.24, L. 17-20).
Where the judgment has expired by operation of law, and is admittedly removed as an
exception on the title report, there is no error in denying the request for quiet title.
3. Bennetts' claim regarding the judgment is moot because the lien of the deed of
trust remains a lien against the property regardless of the judgment.

As discussed below, the lien of the deed of trust survives even after expiration of BEO's
remedies for its enforcement. In these circumstances, quieting title against the expired judgment
would be merely a symbolic act. If it were error to deny quiet title in this situation, it would be
harmless error Idaho R. Civ. P. 61.
4. Bennetts cite no authority for an obligation to "release" an expired judgment
lien and have not pleaded a claim for declaratory judgment.

Bennetts allege in their complaint (R. p. 9, L. 18-19, p. 10, L. 4-5) and repeatedly refer to
BEO's "failure" and "refusal" to release the judgment lien or reconvey their interest in the trust
deed. (App. Br., p. 11-12). However, Bennetts do not cite to any source creating the duty on the
part of BEO to take any affirmative action with respect to these obligations. Certainly, a creditor
is obligated to satisfy a judgment or deed trust once it is paid in full, but has no duty to remove or
satisfy otherwise. To read otherwise would force a creditor to incorrectly assert the debt has been
satisfied when such is not the case.
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Bennetts also argue, for the first time, that the trial court's ruling "denies the Bennetts'
standing to seek a declaratory judgment in this matter" (App. Br., p. 11). Bennetts did not plead a
claim for declaratory judgment in the complaint and did not raise any issue regarding declaratory
judgment in their brief or argument in the trial court.

B.

Because of this Court's holding in Trusty v. Ray, Bennetts may not seek quiet title
against the deed of trust without alleging or tendering payment.
Bennetts are not entitled to the remedy of quiet title against BEO because they have not

pied tender of the debt obligation owing for which the trust deed is security. Idaho law is well
settled in this regard under the principles enumerated in Trusty v. Ray, which remain unimpaired
by Idaho Code § 6-411 and § 6-413: "The general rule is that a mortgagor or his successor in
interest cannot quiet title against a mortgagee, while the secured debt remains unpaid, although
the statute of limitations has run against the right to foreclose the mortgage." Trusty v. Ray, 73
Idaho 232, 236 (1952).
While a quiet title action is a challenge to the defendant's interest in the property, the
plaintiff is asserting his or her own interest in the property in bringing the action. Eagle Equity

Fund, LLC v. TitleOne Corporation, 161 Idaho 355, 362 (2016) (citing Silver Eagle Mining Co.
v. State, 153 Idaho 179, 181 (2012)). A plaintiff seeking to quiet title"must succeed on the
strength of his or her own interest and may not rely upon the weakness of his or her adversary's
interest." Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 260 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing Pincock v. Pocatello Gold
& Copper Min. Co. Inc., l 00 Idaho 325, 331 (1979)).
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Bennetts do not deny that the holding of Trusty v. Ray would bar their claim for quiet title
against Defendant; instead their entire argument is based on the contention that the holding of

Trusty v. Ray conflicts with § 6-411 and § 6-413 and is therefore superseded by the enactment of
those statutes. Despite the apparent conflict between the language contained in § 6-413 with the
holding of Trusty, a review of the equitable principles which form the basis for Trusty show that
the two are able to co-exist without conflict.
Idaho courts have long held that those who seek equity must do equity. Burke Land &

Live-Stock Co. v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 7 Idaho 42, 59 (1900). That principle has been held to
apply to quiet title actions. Quiet title suits are equitable claims for relief by a party seeking to
clear title. Beal v. Mars Larsen Ranch Corp. Inc., 99 Idaho 662, 667 (1978). A mortgage made
unenforceable by the running of the applicable statute of limitations still qualifies as a cloud on
title to real property. When clearing a cloud on title, a mortgagor's duty to act equitably by
paying his debt continues even after enforcement has been barred by the statute of limitations.

Mendini v. Milner, 47 Idaho 439, 445-46 (1929); Miller v. Monroe, 50 Idaho 726, 731 (1931). A
statute of limitations may not be used other than as a shield or defense against the enforcement of
a claim; it may not be used as a sword. 164 A.LR. 13 87.
In order to "do equity" as a condition to receive the equitable relief sought in a suit for
quiet title, a "mortgagor or other person under a moral obligation to pay a debt notwithstanding
the bar of its enforcement arising from the statute of limitations . . . may have such a mortgage
lien removed as a cloud only upon the condition that he pay the amount which in equity he
owes." Id. "Where there is no privity of relation between the mortgagor and the person seeking
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to have the mortgage removed as a cloud, or to have his title quieted as against the mortgagee,
and the latter is under no moral obligation to pay the mortgage debt, the courts seem generally to
regard the situation as one appropriate for granting of affirmative relief without exacting any
condition of payment." Id.
As a preliminary matter, Trusty v. Ray was decided 17 months following the enactment of
the two (2) statutes relied upon by the Bennetts. Bennetts ask this Court to presume that because
the Court in Trusty did not specifically cite to § 6-411 and § 6-413, no party called attention to
these new statutes as applicable to the case, or that it was decided on a different statutory
scheme. In support of this argument, Bennetts cite the statutes listed in Trusty which specifically
relate to the applicable statutes of limitations which applied to the mortgage in question. As
Idaho Code § 6-401 codifies the right to bring quiet title actions in Idaho and was enacted in
193 7, the case was certainly analyzed under the framework of the statutory scheme outlined in
Title 6, Chapter 4 of the Idaho Code. Further contradicting Bennetts' argument that the Court
may not have been aware of new legislation applicable to the case at bar is the dissenting opinion
issued by Justice Keeton where an amendment to Idaho Code § 55-817 made by the same
legislative session enacting § 6-411 and § 6-413 was noted. See Trusty, 73 Idaho at 239. Had
the enactment of § 6-411 and § 6-413 had the effect asserted by Bennetts in this case, the
outcome of Trusty would have been different.
Sections 6-411 and 6-413 address situations where a party seeking to quiet title against
the interest of a mortgage which has been barred by the applicable statute of limitations and the
party seeking such relief is not in privity with the original mortgagor or is not under a
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moral obligation to pay the mortgage debt, he or she may be granted the equitable relief. Any
interpretation of these statutes contrary to this interpretation would grant mortgagors a windfall
in an equitable case by allowing them to remove a lien against real property without paying the
underlying obligation they are morally obligated to satisfy. This is inconsistent with the maxim
of one must do equity to receive equity.
Idaho Courts have repeatedly cited Trusty v. Ray in dismissing case after case where a
party seeks to quiet title against a lien created by a mortgage and where the plaintiff has failed to
plead payment or tender of the secured obligation. See Purdy v. Aegis Wholesale Corp., Civil
No. l:11-cv-00640-EJL-REB, 2012 WL 4470945 (D. Idaho Aug. 17, 2012); In re Mullin, 402
B.R. 353 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2008); Ohlsen v. Bank of America, N.A., Civil No. l:l l-cv-00357BLW-REB, 2012 WL 3285587 (D. Idaho Aug. 10, 2012); Hobson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
No. l:11-cv-00196-BLW, 2012 WL 505917 (D. Idaho Feb. 15, 2012). Also worth noting are
two articles published in the Idaho State Bar journal which have confirmed the status of Idaho
law as it applies to the case at bar as BEO argues here. Derrick J. O'Neill & Lewis N. Stoddard,

Zombies Attack!, The Advocate, Nov./Dec. 2019, at 36; Kelly Greene McConnell, No Free
Houses: Few Mortgages Have Fatal Flaws, The Advocate, Jan., 2012, at 30.
Modem Idaho Supreme Court decisions have continued to uphold the principles
articulated in Trusty. In Losee v. Idaho Co., the Idaho Supreme Court held that in order to
remove a cloud upon title, a debtor has the burden of showing that the title is free from
encumbrance. Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho 219, 222 (2009). Under Idaho Law, lapse of the
statutory period does not remove an encumbrance. A statute of limitations in Idaho is a statute of
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repose, "lapse of the statutory period bars the remedy to enforce the debt but does not extinguish
the debt." Hirning v. Webb, 91 Idaho 229, 231 (1966).
Nothing in § 6-411 and § 6-413 does anything to abrogate the long held principle that
mortgagors cannot assert superior title to a mortgagee where a moral obligation exists to pay the
underlying debt unless the debt has been paid or tender therefore has been made. Absent such a
pleading, Bennetts' quiet title suit must be dismissed.

C.

Bennetts' filing of its Oregon judgment pursuant to the EFJA does not run afoul of
Idaho's One Action rule codified in Idaho Code§§ 45-1503 and 6-101.
I

Bennetts' interpretation of Idaho Code § § 45-1503 and 6-101 would establish a
dangerous approach to the Court's interpretation of Idaho's one action rule and the codified
exceptions in direct contravention of the language set forth in Idaho Code § 6-101 (2). While it is
true Idaho's adoption of a one action rule does restrict the common law right to bring an action
on a debt, note or bond secured by a mortgage, such statutes should be strictly construed because
they are a derogation of a common-law right to pursue alternative remedies at the same time. 59
C.J.S. Mortgages § 455 (2019). The Idaho Legislature has codified this principle in the
exceptions to the one action rule set out in Idaho Code § 6-101 (3) and the directive of Idaho
Code § 6-101 (2) which requires the rule be "construed in order to permit a secured creditor to
realize upon collateral for a debt or other obligation otherwise agreed upon by the debtor and
creditor." Bennetts urged interpretation runs directly in opposition to this intent behind the oneaction rule's limitations.
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BEO's filing of the foreign judgment is permitted under of the one-action rule. The
impact of the one action rule is to bar an action to foreclose on the trust deed, not to invalidate
the lien of the trust deed. The Court should uphold the Trial Court's dismissal of Bennetts' claim.
1. Domestication of a Foreign Judgment which is exempt under Idaho Code §6101(3)(d) is not a separate action from the underlying suit and therefore does not
violate the one action rule.

Bennetts ask this Court to hold that the simple act of filing a judgment under the
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (EFJA) qualifies, on its own, as an "action" for the
recovery of a debt. Such a contention is contradictory to Idaho case law and the purposes and
intent behind Idaho's one action rule.
As a preliminary matter, the filing of a foreign judgment under the EFJA is not a case
separate from the underlying action. Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho 58 (2013). Furthermore, the
filing of a foreign judgment under the EFJA is not properly considered an action based on the
foreign judgment. Id. at 65. Idaho case law is clear; the filing of a foreign judgment is simply an
extension of the underlying action and is not a separate act to seek in personam recovery from
the debtor.
The filing of a foreign judgment does not, on its own, create any execution against the
assets of the debtor. A party filing a foreign judgment must pursue execution on that judgment in
order to realize on the obligation reflected in the judgment. Until such action is taken, there is
nothing distinct from the underlying case to violate the one action rule. This was precisely the
point behind the holding in Grazer; no new Idaho judgment is created by an EFJA filing. Absent
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a separate "action" on the debt, the one-action rule is not violated and Plaintiff would retain the
defense created in Idaho Code § 45-1503 in the event the judgment creditor sought execution of
the foreign judgment.
Even if such a filing of a foreign judgment under the EFJA was a separate action, distinct
from the underlying case, Idaho Code § 6-l0l(m) would exempt it from application of the one
action rule because the registration of the judgment does not, by itself, include the collection of
the debt or the enforcement of the obligation. This is the only interpretation which keeps the
mandate of Idaho Code § 6-101 (2) intact.

2. The impact of violation of the one action rule is a bar to foreclosure of the trust

deed, not invalidation of the lien of the trust deed as suggested by Bennetts.
Idaho Code § 45-1505(4) bars foreclosure of a trust deed by advertisement and sale
where another action, suit or proceed has been commenced and not dismissed. Idaho Code § 451503 provides a further remedy in form of blocking judicial action against the grantor unless the
action is specifically exempt. Nowhere in the statute does the Idaho legislature indicate an intent
that violation of the one action rule should invalidate the lien of the trust deed. Because the one
action rule is a derogation of the common law right to pursue alternative remedies, the Court
should not imply any impact to the statute not clearly manifested in the language approved by the
legislature. Had the legislature intended for a violation of the one action rule to invalidate the
lien of the trust deed, it could have easily so provided. The Court should interpret the language of
the statutes narrowly. Even if BEO was found to have violated the one act rule by filing its own
judgment, had the impact would simply be the loss of the ability to foreclose on the trust deed.
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As discussed above, the inability to foreclose on a trust deed does not invalidate the lien against
the property.
At its core, Idaho's one action rule is a defense to actions on debts secured by real
property. Bennetts ask this Court, in a case in equity, to use the rule to grant them a windfall.
Such an outcome is directly contrary to the principles articulated in the Trusty case as discussed
above. Neither Idaho's one action rule nor the principles of equity allow such an outcome.
Liens of trust deeds are hard to eliminate for good reason. Where an obligation is secured
by a trust deed, the liability to pay the debt rests upon the mortgaged land as well as upon the
mortgagor. Gerken v. Davidson Grocery Co., 50 Idaho 315, 321 (1931). The Trusty decision
already holds that even where a beneficiary is barred from enforcing its remedies under the trust
deed, the lien should survive where equity requires a moral duty to pay the underlying
obligation. The same is true for Idaho's one action rule. Even if a violation of the rule were
found to have occurred, where the underlying obligation secured by the trust deed remains
unpaid, the mortgagor should not be entitled to quiet title against the mortgagee. Any other
application of the one-action rule would violate the principles established in the Trusty decision.
Bennetts do not deny that they have not paid the obligation secured by the trust deed to
BEO, nor have they tendered payment thereon. Bennetts further admit their discharge in
bankruptcy did not remove the lien of the trust deed against the property. (R.p. 66, L. 5-6)
Despite these admissions, Bennetts ask this Court to hold that a court siting in equity should
grant them title to the property free of the lien despite the fact the debt remains unpaid to
Defendant. The Court should not allow such a windfall to occur. These principles can only be
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maintained by holding the remedy for violation of the one action rule to be a loss of foreclosure
remedies and not an invalidation of the lien of the trust deed.

D.

Bennetts are not entitled to atto~ney fees on appeal because Idaho Code § 12-120(3)
does not apply in a suit for quiet title.
In Brower v. E.l DuPont, the Idaho Supreme Court limited the scope of Idaho Code §

12-120(3). In Brower, false representations by DuPont caused a farmer who bought herbicide to
miss out on several years of farm income when the herbicide prevented safe cultivation of the
land for an unexpectedly prolonged period. Brower v. E.l DuPont de Nemours & Co., 117
Idaho 780, 780 (1990). The Court held that the award of attorney's fees is not warranted every
time a commercial transaction is remotely connected with the case. The test is instead, "whether
the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit." Id. at 784. Fees are not
appropriate under § 12-120(3) unless the commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and

constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover. Id. (emphasis added). In that
case, while there was indeed a sale of goods, the claim was based on pre-sale conduct and postsale harm that arose from the use of the product.

The case did not revolve around the

commercial transaction itself sufficiently to implicate § 12-120(3 ). Id.
In Merrill v. Gibson, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled directly on whether § 12-120(3)
applies to quiet title claims. It does not. Merrill v. Gibson, 139 Idaho 840, 845-46. In Merrill, a
property dispute developed between a farmer and his financier regarding whether the money
given to the farmer when he first occupied the property was a loan to finance the farmer's
purchase of the land, or a land purchase by the financier in which the farmer became a
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commercial tenant whose periodic payments to the financier were rent. The financier eventually
filed a quiet title action to settle the dispute in Court. Id. at 843. In assessing the availability of
attorney fees under § 12-120(3), the Court held that the quiet title action involved a
determination of property rights that does not support an award of attorney fees under the statute.
Id. at 845-46. A quiet title action involves the determination of rights to a piece of real property;
it does not involve the validity or breach of a commercial transaction. Id. at 846.
In this case, the Bennetts are seeking attorney ' s fees in an equitable action to quiet title.
This is precisely the situation that was considered in Merrill. The Bennetts seek a judgment
definitively establishing their interest a piece of real property. The economic transaction in the
background of the relationship between the parties is so tangential to the current action that it
cannot reasonably be considered the gravamen of the lawsuit. Therefore, attorney ' s fees are not
recoverable under§ 12-120(3).
VI.

CONCLUSION

BEO requests that this Court affirm the District Court' s judgment dismissing Bennetts'
action for failure to state a claim.
Dated this

tf-f1,,

of February, 2020.

Brian Difonzo, ISB # 7648
Of Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
Bank of Eastern Oregon
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